A Chequer-Board of Nights and Days

Rarely has a political memoir been as detailed--indeed, as mind-numbingly detailed--about a certain political process as has former Mideast envoy Dennis Ross's The Missing Peace. Of course, the mind-numbing detail is important, as Ross states that one of his prime motivations in writing the book was the demolishment of myths blocking a final status agreement regarding the Arab-Israeli peace process.

The myths surrounding the peace process are legion, in Ross's worldview. Israeli beliefs that there need not be any withdrawal from the settlement areas and that Jerusalem need not be divided helped throw impediments in the peace process, according to Ross, as did Arab beliefs that the legitimacy of Israel needed never to be admitted to, that the Second Temple was located not in Jerusalem but in Nablus (a favorite myth perpetrated by Yasser Arafat in order to diminish Israeli claims to Jerusalem) and that Israel would somehow, someway be exhausted into complete and absolute defeat. The amount of detail that Ross throws into his book in seeking to overcome these myths is astonishing and intimidating to those unfamiliar with the peace process. At times, it is possible to get lost in the narrative and exceedingly technical terms and discussions abound concerning the diplomatic process between the Israelis and the Palestinians or the Israelis and the Syrians. But the writing of history is not supposed to be convenient. It is supposed to be accurate and despite the fact that especially great efforts must be made to ensure accuracy when discussing the Arab-Israeli peace process, those Herculean efforts must be undertaken. Having taken on the heavy and laborious duty of outlining in detail the progression of the peace process, Ross deserves praise for providing a wealth of detail and information for students of history to consider.

He deserves praise as well for his ultimate judgments of leaders. Binyamin Netanyahu receives criticism for having been excessively tactical and not sufficiently strategic (indeed, Ross makes clear that he does not think much of Netanyahu as a leader) and Ehud Barak is taken to task for an excessive self-confidence that was married to a tendency for especially grandiose maneuvers. And yet, Ross gives each leader credit for having ultimately stepped up to the plate and having delivered for the peace process more often than not when the process demanded their guidance and assistance. The ultimate leader in Ross's eyes was, of course, Yitzhak Rabin. An admirable blend of soldier and statesman, Rabin could deliver peace in a manner that few people--until Ariel Sharon--could possibly dream of. His attraction as a leader was the same as Richard Nixon's when the latter went to China. Just as Nixon had the anti-Communist credentials necessary to allow him to pull off his maneuver, Rabin had the security and political credentials to effectively sell the concept of a just and lasting peace to the Israeli people and to work effectively with the Palestinians as a partner. Israel would not find so effective a combination of traits until the ascendancy of Ariel Sharon and as with Rabin, fate conspired to rob Sharon of the chance of fulfilling what could have been a great and noble political destiny.

As for the Arab leaders, Ross's portrayals are similarly on target. The late King Hussein of Jordan was largely a noble and courageous leader who helped bring about normalized relations between Israel and Jordan and who sought to broker further breakthroughs between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Hafez al-Assad was a ruthless and brilliant political tactician but someone who could never take the final step towards being a great leader by overcoming the political circumstances that allowed for the continued engenderment of hostilities between Israel and Syria. A respected and tough negotiator, Assad could also be duplicitous, causing many a confrontation with the administrations of George Bush the Elder and Bill Clinton, confrontations that set back the peace process. Hosni Mubarak was a friend of the peace process, but he was also hesitant to stick his neck out for the process many a time. Much of this hesitancy was due to the antics of Yasser Arafat at the 1994 summit in Cairo which culminated in the signing of the Gaza-Jericho maps. At the last minute, Arafat put on a show by refusing to sign the maps and had to be wheedled and persuaded into relenting. By then, of course, Arafat had achieved what he wanted; identifying himself anew as a champion of the Palestinian people and showing that he was willing to bring the peace process to a total halt if only to show that he was willing to exercise every bit of power and act upon every opportunity to represent the Palestinian interest before the world.

Speaking of Arafat, this article details quite effectively Ross's impressions of Arafat:

Then there is Yasser Arafat, the wily, stubborn, recalcitrant, supremely self-serving leader of the Palestinians, who eagerly pocketed every Israeli concession while consistently failing to offer any of his own. As with many tribal chieftains, Arafat's main concerns were maintaining unity among the various Palestinian factions and preserving his own power. Still, Ross points out, no other Palestinian wielded the moral authority to compromise on issues such as the fate of Jerusalem and of Palestinian refugees. Arafat may have been crude and dishonest, Ross concludes, but he was the only game in town.

[. . .]

While Ross is withering in recounting the miscalculations and tantrums on both sides, he holds Arafat most responsible for the failure: "Only one leader was unable or unwilling to confront history and mythology: Yasser Arafat."

And consider this (the following are Ross's own words):

Number one, at Camp David [in 2000] we did not put a comprehensive set of ideas on the table. We put ideas on the table that would have affected the borders and would have affected Jerusalem.

Arafat could not accept any of that. In fact, during the 15 days there, he never himself raised a single idea. His negotiators did, to be fair to them, but he didn't. The only new idea he raised at Camp David was that the temple didn't exist in Jerusalem, it existed in Nablus.

[. . .]

After the summit, he immediately came back to us and he said, "We need to have another summit," to which we said, "We just shot our wad. We got a no from you. You're prepared actually do a deal before we go back to something like that."

He agreed to set up a private channel between his people and the Israelis, which I joined at the end of August. And there were serious discussions that went on, and we were poised to present our ideas the end of September, which is when the intifada erupted. He knew we were poised to present the ideas. His own people were telling him they looked good. And we asked him to intervene to ensure there wouldn't be violence after the Sharon visit, the day after. He said he would. He didn't lift a finger.

Ross also details in the book the frantic efforts of the Clinton Administration to achieve a final status resolution between the Israelis and the Palestinians before President Clinton left office. Once again, Yasser Arafat looked history in the face, was confronted by the chance to achieve a just and lasting peace, and spat at the opportunity:

The ideas were presented on December 23 by the president, and they basically said the following: On borders, there would be about a 5 percent annexation in the West Bank for the Israelis and a 2 percent swap. So there would be a net 97 percent of the territory that would go to the Palestinians.

On Jerusalem, the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem would become the capitol of the Palestinian state.

On the issue of refugees, there would be a right of return for the refugees to their own state, not to Israel, but there would also be a fund of $30 billion internationally that would be put together for either compensation or to cover repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation costs.

And when it came to security, there would be a international presence, in place of the Israelis, in the Jordan Valley.

These were ideas that were comprehensive, unprecedented, stretched very far, represented a culmination of an effort in our best judgment as to what each side could accept after thousands of hours of debate, discussion with each side.

[. . .]

Arafat came to the White House on January 2. Met with the president, and I was there in the Oval Office. He said yes, and then he added reservations that basically meant he rejected every single one of the things he was supposed to give.

[. . .]

He supposed to give, on Jerusalem, the idea that there would be for the Israelis sovereignty over the Western Wall, which would cover the areas that are of religious significance to Israel. He rejected that.

[. . .]

He rejected the idea on the refugees. He said we need a whole new formula, as if what we had presented was non-existent.

He rejected the basic ideas on security. He wouldn't even countenance the idea that the Israelis would be able to operate in Palestinian airspace.

You know when you fly into Israel today you go to Ben Gurion. You fly in over the West Bank because you can't -- there's no space through otherwise. He rejected that.

So every single one of the ideas that was asked of him he rejected.

How did all of this affect Ross's ultimate impressions of Arafat? The former envoy explains in the following exchange:

[BRIT] HUME: What, in your view, was the reason that Arafat, in effect, said no?

ROSS: Because fundamentally I do not believe he can end the conflict. We had one critical clause in this agreement, and that clause was, this is the end of the conflict.

Arafat's whole life has been governed by struggle and a cause. Everything he has done as leader of the Palestinians is to always leave his options open, never close a door. He was being asked here, you've got to close the door. For him to end the conflict is to end himself.

At the end of the book, Ross details his reactions to the Bush Administration's dealings in the Middle East. He credits the Administration for having changed some elements of the American approach to the Middle East by insisting on democratization--a process that Ross believes can help lay the groundwork for a just and lasting peace. But he also argues for a more active American involvement in the Middle East, believing that only America could broker a settlement between the Arabs and the Israelis. This may be so, but it required the passing of Yasser Arafat from the world state (Ross makes clear that he does not mourn Arafat's passing and that he doesn't believe the Palestinian people did or do either) and Ross does not adequately explain why it would have been that more shuttle diplomacy would have succeeded in the Bush Administration where it failed in the Clinton Administration. Ross is quite right in his condemnation of the myths that block the achievement of a just and lasting peace and he should be especially praised for inveighing against the highly anti-Semitic curriculum that exists in states like Saudi Arabia, a curriculum that prevents Arabs from accepting Israelis as equals and making peace with them. But he appears to fail to take his arguments to the next level by accepting the painful reality that until the current generation of Arabs is displaced by one that is not poisoned with the anti-Semitic teachings so popular in so many Arab states, a just and lasting peace may not be possible, or, at best, may only be possible in increments.

The Missing Peace is ultimately a tragic story. One cannot help but have pangs of sympathy and regret for the missed opportunities that are part and parcel of the history of the peace process. One cannot help but sympathize with Ross, who made the achievement of Middle East peace his nearly sole passion for 12 years--stretching from the Reagan Administration to the Clinton Administration. All of the detail found in the book may ultimately help a future negotiation process achieve the peace sought so tenaciously by Ross and others. If so, Dennis Ross will have been successful in ensuring that his book is considered not just a retrospective, but a guidepost.