A Chequer-Board of Nights and Days

Is aptly summarized by William Kristol:

ON THURSDAY, AUGUST 11, in Crawford, Texas, President Bush met with his foreign policy team. At a press conference afterwards, he strongly reiterated the core elements of his war policy: We're engaged in a global war on terror; the central front of that war is Iraq; we're committed to winning in Iraq, and to defeating the terrorists, and their sponsors, around the world.

The president was asked about pulling U.S. troops out of Iraq. His response was unequivocal: "Pulling the troops out would send a terrible signal to the enemy. Immediate withdrawal would say to the Zarqawis of the world, and the terrorists of the world, and the bombers who take innocent life around the world, you know, the United States is weak; and all we've got to do is intimidate and they'll leave."

A week later, Vice President Cheney spoke to the 73rd National Convention of the Military Order of the Purple Heart. He, too, offered a strong defense of the core Bush administration understanding of the war on terror: "This is not a war we can win strictly on the defensive. Our only option against these enemies is to find them, to fight them, and to destroy them. . . . Iraq is a critical front in the war on terror, and victory there is critical to the future security of the United States and other free nations. We know this, and the terrorists know it as well."

One sentence, however, stood out like a sore thumb in both the president's and the vice president's remarks: "As Iraqis stand up, we'll stand down," the president said. "And over time, as Iraqi forces stand up, American forces will stand down," repeated the vice president.

Now, it is probably the case that a couple of years from now we will be able responsibly to reduce the number of American forces in Iraq. But the "stand up/stand down" formulation goes beyond that. It suggests--and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld has repeatedly elaborated on this thought--that as Iraqi soldiers get trained, they will replace Americans, apparently regardless of our progress toward victory in the war.

But this formulation--and this policy, if it becomes policy--is, to quote the president, "a terrible signal" to send to the enemy. The enemy should confront the unpleasant prospect of soon facing the current level of American forces supplemented by an ever-growing number of Iraqi fighters. Our enemies should not have the impression that, by continuing the terror, they can secure the reward of facing (inevitably) less-able Iraqi forces in place of American troops.

Quite so. Indeed, inasmuch as they may not have intended it to be the case, the formulation proffered by the President and Vice President only serves to encourage the terrorists to wait out the withdrawal of American troops. But withdrawal must be tied with a corresponding weakening of the insurgency and should there be any overcompensation, it should be in favor of keeping a powerful and substantial troop presence in Iraq until the insurgency is mortally wounded. We do not expect to get rid of every hoodlum in the country, and yes, it is ultimately the job of the Iraqis to police their own state. And yes, it is important to ensure that the presence of American forces does not serve as a crutch for an ill-prepared Iraqi force. But it is a strange kind of military strategy that proposes--in effect--to let up on the enemy even as we destroy him.